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Case No. 20070659-CA 
IN THE J 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
A. PAUL SCHWENKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee j 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant, Paul Schwenke, appeals from his conviction for securities 
fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 
2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the State, establish that Schwenke offered for sale a "security" and 
I 
did it otherwise establish that Schwenke omitted material facts necessary to 
make a prior statement not misleading? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court will reverse a jury verdict for 
insufficient evidence only "when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he or she was convicted/ " State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, j^ 18,10 
P.3d 346 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting testimony from the State's expert 
witness regarding the usual characteristics of "stock"? 
Standard of Review. "The trial court has wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the prosecutor misstate the law regarding criminal liability for 
material omissions and were Schwenke's constitutional rights otherwise 
violated by an erroneous view of the law? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews prosecutorial misconduct 
claims for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Tilt, 2004 UT App 395, f 11,101 
P.3d 838. Claims alleging constitutional violations are questions of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, Tf 7,139 P.3d 1066. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a loan 
secured by Schwenke as president of American-Dairy.com, of Schwenke's 
agreement to pay for additional cows and his subsequent failure to pay for 
them, and of the requirements for an initial public offering? 
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Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews a trial court's relevancy 
determination for an abuse of discretion. Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT 
App 35, If 9, 204 P.3d 204. 
* * * 
Notwithstanding the foregoing standards of review, the appellate court 
will not address claims where the issue was not preserved below and the 
defendant has not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 23,128 P.3d 1171. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to a determination of the 
case on appeal and are reproduced in relevant part in Addendum A: Utah Code 
Ann. § 6144 (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 614-13 (West 2009); and Utah 
Code Ann. § 614-27 (West 2004).] 
1
 The State cites to the current versions of these statutes in its brief because 
there have either been no changes to those provisions since Schwenke's 
commission of the offense or the changes have not been substantive. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged the defendant, A. Paul Schwenke, with securities fraud, 
a second degree felony. R. 62-64.2 Following a preliminary hearing, Schwenke 
was bound over for trial on both counts. R. 65-67. Following a two-day trial, a 
jury found Schwenke guilty of securities fraud as charged. R. 334-37, 338-40, 
369. Schwenke was thereafter sentenced to a prison term of one-to-fifteen years, 
to run consecutively with the prison term he was already serving. R. 420-21, 
460-62. Schwenke timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 470-71. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1980, Ron Myers purchased 145 acres of land and built a dairy farm on 
it. R.4: 219. He later organized the farm as Milk-King Dairy, L.C, a limited 
liability corporation, with Myers, his son-in-law Jim Young, and Young's 
brother JL as members. R.3:115,117; R.4:219. By the year 2000, Jim Young was 
managing the day-to-day operations of Milk-King Dairy, which held between 
200 to 300 cows. R.3:115,117. Although Milk-King Dairy was struggling by the 
summer of 2000, Young was able to remain current on the farm's various 
financial obligations, including its mortgage payment to Central Bank. R.3:116, 
i 
2
 Defendant was also charged with theft by deception, but that charge was 
later dismissed. Jamis M. Johnson was charged as a co-defendant in the case, 
but the district court later entered an order severing the trials of the two men. < 
See R. 62-64. 
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118-19. The farm itself appraised for $400,000 and Central Bank had a $225,000 
mortgage on the property. R.3:116-17. 
In July 2000, a cattle dealer introduced Young to Schwenke, who " wanted 
to meet with some dairies about [an] investment opportunity/7 R.3: 119-20. 
Young met with Schwenke and Victor Lawrence, the incorporators of American-
Dairy .Com, Inc, in Fillmore, Utah, to discuss Schwenke's proposal. R.3:119-20; 
SEl. Other persons associated with American-Dairy.com were also present at 
the meeting, including Jamis Johnson, who was introduced as a lawyer and an 
expert in stocks. R.3: 120-21. He was also the company's CEO. See SE2. 
Schwenke indicated that "he used to be a lawyer, but that he was doing things 
like this now/7 R.3: 126. Schwenke did not tell Young that he had been 
disbarred. R.3:126. 
Schwenke explained that he had created a corporation called American-
Dairy.com and that "he wanted . . . to get several dairies together, and about 10 
or 15,000 cows, several dairies, and basically form a publically traded 
company." R.3: 121-23,175-76; R.4: 257-58. Schwenke asked Young to trade 
Milk-King Dairy "for stock" in American Dairy.com. R.3:123. Schwenke told 
Young that he intended to "basically take control of the farm, pay off all the 
debt, and it would become part of Americanf-JDairy.com/' R.3:124-25,184; R.4: 
239. He said he would pay off the mortgage with money from a group of 
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private investors that "he had." R.3:125,139, 204. "[H]e said he had about $10 
million dollars in assets to invest/7 R.3: 125. Under the proposal, the dairy 
farmers who traded their farms for American-Dairy.com stock would continue 
to manage the farms. R.3:181-82. 
Schwenke explained that the stock "wasn't worth anything at the time, 
but . . . once [they] had an initial public offering, he expected it to go up from 
there." R.3: 123. As pitched by Schwenke, the initial public offering, or IPO, 
"was kind of the foundation of the whole idea" because "[t]hat's where the 
money was going to come from." R.3:127. Schwenke said that he planned on 
putting cameras in the dairies "so that potential shareholders could. . . see what 
was going on in the dairies . . . so they'd know what they were buying." R.3: 
122. 
A week later, Myers joined Young for a meeting with Schwenke and 
Johnson in Salt Lake City. R.3:131-32; R.4: 224-25. Schwenke presented Myers 
and Young with a stock purchase trade agreement, which provided for the sale 
of American-Dairy.com stock in exchange for the Milk-King Dairy properties 
and equipment. R.3:133-35; SE2. Schwenke again explained that "they wanted 
to get to the point where they could have an initial public offering and sell stock 
in the company and then [their] stock would be worth something." R.3:134; R.4: 
259-60. Myers and Young "knew [they] were selling [their] farm to American 
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Dairy.com/' R.3:134. The expectation, and the premise of the whole deal, was 
that the company would go public and in that way, the stock would be of value. 
R.3: 134; R.4: 228, 259-63. The men understood that there was some risk, but 
both Schwenke and Johnson represented that "the risk was fairly low/7 R.4: 271-
72. 
Myers and Young did not sign the agreement at that time. R.3:133; R.4: 
228. About a week later, Myers and Young met with Schwenke again. R.3:134-
35. They insisted that the agreement be modified to include a provision that 
permitted them to get out of the deal if American-Dairy.com did not proceed 
with an initial public offering — "the foundation of the whole plan/7 R.3:141-42; 
R.4: 228,236-37. The agreement was thereafter modified to include an option to 
repurchase the Milk-King Dairy property in the event American-Dairy.com did 
not register its stock for a public offering. SE2; R.3:141; R.4: 258-59. 
On August 9, 2000, after their attorney reviewed the agreement, Myers 
and Young met with Schwenke and Johnson, signed the Stock Purchase/Trade 
Agreement, and completed the purchase of the stock by conveying to American-
Dairy .com the real property, equipment, and other property of Milk-King Dairy. 
R.3:134-35,143-46,157, 204, 211-12; R.4: 238-39; SE2-4. Young received 50,000 
shares of stock and Myers received 150,000 shares of stock. SE2, SE5-6; R.3:152-
53,157. Johnson signed the agreement as the CEO of American-Dairy.com. SE2; 
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R.3: 146/ That same day, Myers and Young signed proxy agreements, 
authorizing Schwenke to vote as their proxy at all shareholders meetings "for 
the transaction of any business'7 of the company. SE7-8; R.3:162-63; R.4: 232-33, 
268-69. Schwenke told them he needed the proxy agreements "to carry on the 
business of American Dairy.com/' R.3:162. 
After trading the dairy farm for the American-Dairy.com stock, Young 
continued to manage dairy operations, as planned. R.3:139,157,182, 205; R.4: 
241, 264. Although he continued to pay on many of the farm's financial 
obligations, Young no longer controlled the dairy farm assets. R.3:183,196-97, 
199-201. Schwenke, as president of American-Dairy.com, controlled the 
company's assets. R.3:183. 
Within a week or so after the stock purchase, Young approached 
Schwenke about purchasing additional cows. R.3:158. Schwenke spoke with 
the cattle dealer, and after assuring him that he would pay for the cows, 
purchased 200 heifers on behalf of the company. R.3:158-59,205; R.4:241-44. In 
October 2000, Schwenke obtained a loan in the sum of the $30,000 from PDN 
Investments on behalf of American-Dairy.com, without notifying either Myers 
or Young. R.3:185,188,199; R.4: 277-78; SE10. Schwenke signed a trust deed as 
3
 As a favor to Schwenke, Johnson acted as American-Dairy.com's CEO 
only on the day the agreement was signed. R.4: 280-81. 
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president of the company, conveying the recently acquired Milk-King Dairy 
property to PDN Investments, to secure payment of $30,000 PDN loan and 
payment of a $20,000 obligation previously incurred by Schwenke. SE10; R.3: 
165,199; R.4:247. Schwenke ultimately failed to make payment for the 200 cows 
purchased in August and they were repossessed two months later. R.3:159-60, 
191; R.4: 244-45. In December 2000, a notice of default was entered for 
American-Dairy.corn's failure to pay the PDN Investments obligation. SE11; 
R.3:185-86,188,193-94. 
In an attempt to save the farm, Myers began looking for someone willing 
to buy or lease the farm in November or December of 2000. R.3:182-83,200; R.4: 
245-46, 266. But when Myers found suitors, Schwenke would not permit the 
sale or lease of the farm. R.3:182-83, 200; R.4: 245-46, 266. By about that time, 
Young had also exhausted his available funds on the original mortgage and in 
calving the newly purchased cows, and the dairy ceased operations. R.3:157, 
159,198, 206. Despite Schwenke7s assurances that he would take care of the 
mortgage payments, he never did and the following year, the bank foreclosed 
on the property. R.3:160-61,194, 202, 206, 210; R.4: 246-47; SE11. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Elements of securities fraud. An instrument labeled "stock" is a 
security under the Utah Uniform Securities Act so long as it possesses the usual 
characteristics of stock. The evidence in this case established that the American-
Dairy.com stock was "stock" under the Act. The "economic reality" test has no 
application in determining whether an instrument is stock. The test is used to 
determine whether an instrument is an "investment contract." 
To prevail on a securities fraud claim based on a material omission, the 
State must establish that the defendant made a material statement that was false, 
inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading in light of undisclosed information. 
Contrary to Schwenke's claim, the State identified several predicate statements 
which created a duty to disclose additional material facts. For example, 
Schwenke said that American-Dairy.com would make an initial public offering 
(IPO) of its stock and represented that there was little risk in that not happening. 
In so stating, Schwenke assumed a duty to disclose the need to secure an 
underwriter and to identify factors that would put a risk the ability to make an 
IPO. He did not. Schwenke also indicated that "he used to be a lawyer, but that 
he was doing things like this now." R.3:126. This created a duty to disclose that 
he had been disbarred, but again, he did not. Finally, Schwenke's role as an 
incorporator and officer of the corporation created a duty of full disclosure 
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regarding his own circumstances and the corporation's assets once he disclosed 
that he had created the corporation and offered to sell the stock. 
In any event, the State's case did not rest exclusively on material 
omissions. It also rested on proof that Schwenke made an untrue statement of 
material fact. In pitching the stock purchase, Schwenke represented that he had 
ten million dollars in assets to invest. The evidence established that he did not. 
II. Expert testimony on characteristics of stock. Schwenke's challenge 
on appeal to expert testimony regarding the characteristics of stock was not 
preserved below. Because Schwenke has not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, this Court should not address his claim for the first time on 
appeal. In any event, the expert's testimony on stock characteristics is the very 
kind of specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding 
matters beyond the knowledge of the average person. 
III. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct and constitutional violations. 
This Court should not address Schwenke's claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct, because he did not preserve it below and has not argued plain error 
or exceptional circumstances. In any event, the prosecution did not misstate the 
law regarding the elements necessary to prove securities fraud based on a 
material omission. To the contrary, the prosecutor acknowledged that material 
omissions are actionable only if their nondisclosure rendered a prior statement 
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misleading. Accordingly, Schwenke's constitutional claims based on the 
premise that the prosecutor misstated the law fail. In addition, Schwenke's 
claim that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him fails. 
The information and preliminary hearing provided adequate notice. 
IV. Relevancy of evidence. Evidence of the loan secured by a trust deed 
was relevant to the issue of Schwenke's control over the corporation. Evidence 
of Schwenke's agreement to pay for additional cows and his failure to do so was 
relevant to the issue of Schwenke's intent. Evidence regarding IPO's was 
relevant to the issue of Schwenke's misleading statements made in connection 




THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED SCHWENKE'S GUILT FOR 
SECURITIES FRAUD 
Schwenke was convicted by a jury of violating section 61-1-1 of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, which makes it unlawful to defraud another in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, 
sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading; or 
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004). On appeal, Schwenke claims that the 
State failed to establish: (1) the offer, sale, or purchase of a "security," and (2) the 
omission of a material fact that was necessary to make a prior statement not 
misleading. Aplt. Brf. at 16-25. His claim fails. 
A. THE TRANSACTION AT ISSUE INVOLVED THE OFFER, SALE, AND 
PURCHASE OF SECURITIES. 
The Utah Uniform Securities Act defines the term "security" in broad and 
general terms: 
Security" means a . . . note; . . . stock;. . . treasury stock;.. . 
bond;. . . debenture;. . . evidence of indebtedness;.. . certificate of 
interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement;... collateral 
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trust certificate;. . . preorganization certificate or subscription;. . . 
transferable share;. . . investment contract;. . . burial certificate or 
burial contract;. . . voting-trust certificate;. . . certificate of deposit 
for a security; . . . certificate of interest or participation in an oil, 
gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of production under 
such a title or lease;. . . commodity contract or commodity option; 
. . . interest in a limited liability company; life settlement interest; or 
. . . in general, an interest or instrument commonly known as a 
"security/' or a certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase an item listed in Subsections 
(l)(ee)(i)(A) through (R). 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(l)(ee)(i) (West Supp. 2009). Thus, like the Securities 
Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (2000), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) ("federal Acts"), the Utah Act has defined 
"security" so as "to include . . . the many types of instruments that in our 
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." United 
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
"The face of the definition shows that 'stock' is considered to be a 
'security' within the meaning" of the Utah Act, just as it is under the federal 
Acts. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,686 (1985). Indeed, "common 
stock is the quintessence of a security." Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 
(1990). Schwenke nevertheless contends that under the "economic reality test" 
developed by the United States Supreme Court, the American-Dairy.com stock 
he sold to Myers and Young were not securities, "as a matter of law." Aplt. Brf. 
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at 22. He argues that because Myers and Young continued to run the day-to-
day operations of the farm, the " economic reality of the transaction" was 
"merely a change of form [of the dairy business] from a limited liability 
company to a corporation," not a purchase of securities. Aplt. Brf. at 24-25. 
Schwenke's argument lacks merit because the economic reality test is not 
applicable in determining whether a stock is a security. 
1. The "economic reality" test does not apply where the 
instrument bears the name and usual characteristics of stock. 
The "economic reality" test has its origin in SEC v. W.]. Howey Co., 328 
U.S. 293 (1946). In that case, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 
"investment contract," one of the instruments specifically identified as a 
"security" under the federal Acts, as well as under the Utah Act. The Court 
observed that in determining whether a particular scheme or contract is an 
investment contract, "[f]orm [is] disregarded for substance and emphasis [is] 
placed upon economic reality." Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. The Court held that "a 
contract, transaction or scheme" will be deemed an "investment contract" where 
"a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits 
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Id. at 298-99. 
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the 
Supreme Court was again asked to determine whether a particular instrument 
was a security within the meaning of federal securities law, to wit: shares of 
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"stock" in a low-income housing cooperative that entitled purchasers to lease an 
apartment of varying size depending on the amount of stock purchased. 
Although "stock" is expressly identified as a security under the federal Acts, the 
Court held that "the name given to the instrument is not dispositive." Forman, 
421 U.S. at 850. The Court held that the instrument must also "embod[y] some 
of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named 
instrument." Id. The Court found that the "stock" in the housing cooperative 
did not possess the typical characteristics of stock, such as the right to receive 
dividends, the right to vote, or the ability to appreciate in value, and thus 
concluded that it was not "stock" under federal securities law. Id. at 851. 
The Court in Forman also rejected a claim that the co-op instruments 
constituted an "investment contract." Id. at 851-58. In doing so, it examined 
"the economic realities of the transaction," as directed under Howey. Id. at 851-
52. The Court explained that" [w]hat distinguishes a security transaction — and 
what is absent [from the co-op instruments] — is an investment where one parts 
with his money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, and 
not where he purchases a commodity for personal consumption or living 
quarters for personal use." Id. at 858. The Court held that the co-op instruments 
at issue did not constitute an investment contract, because they represented the 
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"type of economic interest [that] characterizes every form of commercial 
dealing/7 Id. 
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), the Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether the Howey economic reality test must in all 
I 
cases be applied in determining whether an instrument is a security— the very 
claim Schwenke makes here. The Court held that the economic reality test does 
not apply in determining whether an instrument constitutes "stock/7 Landreth, 
471 U.S. at 66-97. 
In Landreth, a Massachusetts tax attorney purchased all of the common 
stock of a lumber corporation owned by Ivan K. Landreth and his sons. Id. at 
683. After purchasing all of the stock in the family corporation, the attorney 
assigned it to a corporation "formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the 
lumber company stock77 and that corporation "merged with the lumber 
company, forming [the] Landreth Timber Co.77 ("LTC77). Id. at 683-84. When the 
lumber mill did not meet expectations, LTC filed suit against the Landreth 
family, alleging that they had "made misrepresentations and had failed to state 
material facts as to the worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in 
violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.77 Id. at 684. 
On certiorari, the Landreths argued that "in every instance [courts must] 
look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the 
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Howey [economic reality] test has been met/7 Id. at 690. They contended that the 
stock in the Landreth family corporation should not be treated as a security, 
because LTC "sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a 
company that it could manage and control/7 Id. at 690. The Supreme Court 
rejected their argument. 
The Landreth Court held that "[t]here is no need . . . to look beyond the 
characteristics of [an] instrument" labeled "stock," so long as "its characteristics 
bear out the label." Id. at 690-91. In other words, "stock [can] be found to be a 
'security7 simply because it is what it purports to be," without examining the 
economic substance of the transaction. Id. at 691. The Court summarized its 
holding in a companion case issued the same day: "[W]here an instrument bears 
the label 'stock7 and possesses all of the characteristics typically associated with 
stock, a court will not be required to look beyond the character of the instrument 
to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the stock is a 
'security/77 Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985). 
In contrast, the Landreth court held, "the Howey economic reality test was 
designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an 'investment 
contract/ not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory 
definition of 'security/77 such as stock. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691-92. The Court 
observed that the economic reality test has only been applied in cases 
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"involving] unusual instruments not easily characterized as 'securities.'" Id. at 
690. For example, although the instruments in Forman "bore the traditional label 
'stock/ [they] were not 'securities7 because they possessed none of the usual 
characteristics of stock/' Id. at 689. Only after concluding that the co-op 
instruments were not stock did the Supreme Court in Forman turn to the 
economic reality test to determine whether those instruments qualified as an 
"investment contract" under the "economic realities" test. Id. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Landreth five years later in Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). The Court held that "an instrument bearing the name 
'stock7 that, among other things, is negotiable, offers the possibility of capital 
appreciation, and carries the right to dividends contingent on the profits of a 
business enterprise is plainly within the class of instruments . . . the securities 
laws [were intended] to cover." Reves, 494 U.S. at 62. The Court explained that 
Landreth recognizes that "stock is, as a practical matter, always an investment if 
it has the economic characteristics traditionally associated with stock." Id. 
Accordingly," [e]ven if sparse exceptions to this generalization can be found, the 
public perception of common stock as the paradigm of a security suggests that 
stock, in whatever context it is sold, should be treated as within the ambit of the 
[securities laws]." Id. 
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2. The American-Dairy.com stock constituted securities under 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
Applying Landreth to the facts of this case, the American-Dairy.com stock 
purchased by Myers and Young bore the label and possessed the usual 
characteristics of stock and thus fell within the definition of securities under the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act.4 
The American-Dairy.com stock purchased by Myers and Young bore the 
label "stock." See SE5 & SE6. It also possessed the usual characteristics of 
common stock. First and foremost, the American-Dairy.com stock had the 
capacity to appreciate in value and was, indeed, purchased with that goal in 
mind. See SE2 (providing ".001 cents par value common stock" and sold at $1 
per share); R.3:123,127 (representing that stock would increase in value when it 
went public). The stock was negotiable. See SE5 & SE6 (stating that it was 
"transferable . . . by the holder . . . upon surrender of this Certificate properly 
endorsed"); see also SE2. The American-Dairy.com stock also conferred "voting 
rights" as "provided in the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act." SE1; see 
also SE7 & SE8 (proxy agreements authorizing Schwenke to vote as proxy at all 
shareholders meetings). And finally, nothing on the face of the stock suggested 
4
 Although Utah courts are not required to adhere to federal law in 
interpreting provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, see State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355, 1359-60 (Utah 1993), the Act's "general purpose" includes 
"coordinating] the interpretation and administration of [the Act] with the 
related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (West 2004). 
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any restrictions in the right to receive dividends contingent upon apportionment 
of profits or in the right to pledge or hypothecate the stock. See SE5 & SE6. 
Because the American-Dairy.com stock bore the label and possessed the 
usual characteristics of stock, it squarely fell within the definition of a "security" 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(l)(ee). 
Accordingly, under Landreth, the economic reality test is inapplicable and 
Schwenke's claim fails. 
B, SCHWENKE FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS NECESSARY TO 
MAKE STATEMENTS H E MADE N O T MISLEADING. 
As noted above, a person may be found guilty of securities fraud in one of 
three ways. A person involved in the offer, sale, or purchase of a security is 
guilty of securities fraud if he or she: 
(1) Employ[s] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Makefs] any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading; or 
(3) Engage [s] in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. At trial, the State's case rested primarily on the second 
alternative, i.e., Schwenke made an "untrue statement of a material fact" or 
failed to disclose "a material fact necessary in order to make the statements [he] 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they [were] made, not 
misleading/7 Id. On appeal, Schwenke challenges the State's evidence as to 
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material omissions. He acknowledges that the State introduced numerous facts 
that were not disclosed. Aplt. Brf. at 17-18. He claims, however, that the State 
failed to identify any predicate statements that were misleading absent the 
omitted information. Aplt. Brf. at 18-21. His claim fails. 
* * * 
To prevail under the "material omission" alternative of Utah's securities 
fraud statute, the State must establish that the defendant failed to disclose "a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements [he] made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they [were] made, not misleading/7 Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1—1(2). "In order to be actionable,. . . [an] omission must pertain to 
material information that the defendant had a duty to disclose." City of Monroe 
Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,669 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(construing the federal securities fraud provision).5 "Silence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading . . . ." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 
(1988). 
When a party does speak in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of 
a security, "he assumes a duty to provide complete and non-misleading 
information with respect to the subjects on which he undertakes to speak." 
Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998); accord In re: 
5
 Section 61-1-1 is substantially identical to the federal securities fraud 
provision. See 17C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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K-Tel Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881,898 (8th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a person 
offering to sell securities "may be liable for fraud if he . . . tells [the prospective 
purchaser] misleading half-truths/7 United States v. Shelly, 442 F.3d 94, 97 (2nd 
Cir. 2006). 
The question in a securities fraud case based on a material omission " is 
not whether [a speaker's] silence can give rise to liability, but whether liability 
may flow from his decision to speak . . . concerning material details of the 
proposed investment, without revealing certain additional known facts 
necessary to make his statements not misleading." Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & 
Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir, 1998). The State must therefore establish that 
the defendant made a material statement that was "false, inaccurate, incomplete, 
or misleading in light of the undisclosed information" Shaw v. Digital Equipment 
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194,1202 n.3 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added), superseded on other 
grounds by statute as stated in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
Contrary to Schwenke's claim on appeal, the State introduced evidence 
that Schwenke made a predicate statement that was " 'inaccurate, incomplete or 
misleading7 " in light of undisclosed information. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d at 
669 (quoting In re Digital Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 322,329 n.10 (3rd Cir. 2004)). 
As the prosecutor pointed out to the jury during closing argument, R.4:404-10, 
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Schwenke told Myers and Young that the American-Dairy.com stock would be 
offered to the public pursuant to an initial public offering (IPO), which was 
represented as the "foundation" of the plan. R.3:127,141-42; R.4: 228, 236-37. 
As explained by Young, Schwenke represented the IPO as close to "a sure 
thing/7 R.3: 141, and Myers testified that Schwenke "said there would be an 
IPO." R.4: 269. And to the extent that risk was discussed, Myers testified that 
both Schwenke and Johnson represented that the "the risk was fairly low/7 R.4: 
271-72. 
Schwenke7s representation that the corporation would make an initial 
public offering of the stock was a material statement that created a duty of full 
and complete disclosure regarding factors that may undermine the corporation's 
ability to make an initial public offering. As the State's expert witness 
explained, before an underwriter will undertake an IPO on behalf of a 
corporation, it will do "a tremendous amount of . . . due diligence concerning 
the requirements for disclosure, including risk, capitalization, distribution, 
commissions to be paid, [and] background of the principals and control persons 
involved in the issuing company.77 R.3: 98. He explained that underwriters are 
likely to back down from sponsoring an IPO where "there is a significant 
discipline history or other history of principals involved and control persons 
involved in the issuing of the stock/7 R.3: 99; R.4: 283-84. 
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Schwenke's failure to disclose the necessity of securing an underwriter 
and the facts which would place at risk the ability to secure an underwriter 
rendered his prior statement regarding the IPO misleading. See R.4: 228. Of 
added significance was Schwenke's failure to disclose his own background. For 
example, he failed to disclose the fact he was not an attorney, because he had 
been disbarred. R.3:126,201; R.4: 231. He also failed to disclose the existence of 
civil suits against him and a federal tax lien of more than $400,000. See SE12; 
R.3: 126,148-49; R.4: 246-47. Myers and Young both testified that these facts 
would have been important in making their decision. See R.3:148-49, 201-02; 
R.4: 231-32, 246-47, 272-73. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "a company is 
generally under no obligation to disclose its expectations for the future to the 
investing public/' Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.2d at 670 (quotations and citations 
omitted). However, '"[i]f a [seller] 'chooses to volunteer such information/ . . . 
'its disclosure must be full and fair, and courts may conclude that the [seller] 
was obliged to disclose additional material facts . . . to the extent that the 
volunteered disclosure was misleading/ " Id. (citation omitted). Such was the 
case here. 
Another predicate statement identified by the prosecution was 
Schwenke's representation as to his status as an attorney. See R.4: 283. 
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Schwenke told Young only that "he used to be a lawyer, but that he was doing 
things like this now." R.3: 126. The statement was misleading absent a 
disclosure that he had been disbarred. R.3: 126. Where Schwenke was 
considered a "promoter" and "control person" in the industry by virtue of his 
role as an incorporator and president of the corporation, see R.3: 92-93, his 
professional status was material. See R.3: 92-95; R.4: 287. Myers testified that 
had he known of Schwenke7s disbarment, he "[absolutely" would not have 
entered into the agreement. R.4: 265-66. Young also testified that that fact 
would have been something he would have considered in making his decision. 
R.3:143. 
The Supreme Court has also held that corporate insiders, such as 
Schwenke, are generally prohibited from selling shares in their corporation 
"unless [they] first disclose[ ] all material inside information known" to them. 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). The Court in Chiarella 
explained that "[t]he obligation to disclose or abstain derives from . . . '[a]n 
affirmative duty to disclose material information^ which] has been traditionally 
imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Court held that "'insiders must 
disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but 
which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, 
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would affect their investment judgment/ " Id. (citation omitted). Information 
regarding an insider's professional licensing, tax liens, and civil litigation, as 
well as information regarding the corporation's assets, would appear to fall 
within this category.6 
"k -k -k 
The State's case, however, did not rest solely on allegations of material 
omissions. The State also alleged that Schwenke made an untrue statement of 
material fact. See R.4:403. Schwenke told Myers and Young that "he had about 
$10 million dollars in assets to invest" and from that money he would "pay off 
all the debt" on the farm and "it would become part of Americanf-]Dairy.com." 
R.3:124-25,184; R.4:239. R.3:125. This statement proved to be false. Schwenke 
gave testimony to the Utah Division of Securities that American-Dairy.com "had 
no financial documents, no bank accounts," and no assets at the time of the 
stock purchase/trade agreement, but that it "was essentially a paper entity." 
R.4: 280. Moreover, the fact that the corporation had no investment money was 
further established when Schwenke admitted to Young that he had no money to 
pay for the additional cows. See R.3: 164. The proof of an untrue statement, 
without reliance on omissions, was sufficient itself to establish securities fraud. 
6
 The failure to disclose as an insider is actionable under subsections (1) 
and (3) of the securities fraud statute, rather than subsection (2). See Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 225-26 &n.5. 
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II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER SCHWENKE'S 
UNPRESERVED CHALLENGE TO EXPERT TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STOCK. 
Schwenke next contends that Michael Hines, the State's expert witness, 
"gave impermissible legal opinion" regarding the characteristics of stock. Aplt. 
Brf. at 26-29. The Court should reject this argument. 
Schwenke did not object to Hines7 testimony regarding the characteristics 
of stock. See R.3: 84-85, 102; R.4: 288. Schwenke claims that he did, but the 
record cite upon which he relies was an objection to Hines7 testimony as to 
whether he heard any evidence of "a predicate statement made by Mr. 
Schwenke that opened the door and needed to be clarified so it wasn't a half-
truth." R.4: 283. The law is well settled that an objection "must 'be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of the very error7 of which counsel 
complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (citation 
omitted). Schwenke's objection to Hines7 testimony regarding a predicate 
statement did not give notice of a challenge to Hines7 testimony regarding the 
characteristics of stock. Accordingly, his claim on appeal is unpreserved. 
Where Schwenke has not argued either plain error or exceptional circumstances, 
this Court should not consider his unpreserved claim for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, t 23,128 P.3d 1171. 
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In any event, Hines' testimony regarding the characteristics of stock was 
permissible under the rules. Rule 702 permits expert testimony where it "will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue/7 
Utah R. Evid. 702(a). As discussed above, "the name given to an instrument is 
not dispositive." Forman, 421 U.S. at 850. It must also "embod[y] some of the 
significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument," as 
recognized in "'our commercial world/" Id. at 851 (citation omitted). Hines' 
testimony in this regard was the very kind of technical or specialized knowledge 
that rule 702 contemplates. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 (recognizing that " 'the 
technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average layman 
or a subject within the common experience' ").7 
III. 
S e H W hN KE'S PROSECU' I ORIAL M1SCON U U C i \ N D 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE THE 
PROSECUTOR ACCURATELY CHARGED AND ARGUED THE 
LAW 
In his third claim on appeal, Schwenke alleges prosecutorial misconduct 
and various violations of his federal and state constitutional rights. Aplt. Brf. at 
29-37. His challenges lack merit. 
7
 Nor was Hines' testimony inappropriate to the extent it may have 
touched on an ultimate issue. See Utah R. Evid. 704(a) (providing that 
"testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact." Utah R. Evid. 704(a). 
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A. SCHWENKE D I D N O T PRESERVE H I S CLAIM OF PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
Schwenke argues that the State created its own law in defining the statute. 
Aplt. Brf. at 29-37. He contends that the prosecutor ignored the requirement 
that omissions become fraudulent only when necessary to make a prior material 
statement "not misleading/' and represented to the jury that a guilty verdict 
required only a finding of an omission. Aplt. Brf. at 30-34. Without identifying 
it as such, Schwenke's claim amounts to an allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct. See State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, | 28,173 P.3d 170 (holding that 
"[wjhen the prosecution misstates the law . . ., it necessarily calls the jurors' 
attention to matters that they are not justified in considering"), cert, denied, 186 
P.3d 957 (Utah 2008). Schwenke, however, did not object to the prosecutor's 
arguments and thus failed to preserve for appeal his claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct. See R.3: 90-93, 96-97,101; R.4: 286,406-08. Because Schwenke has 
not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court should not 
address his claim. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, at If 23.8 
Where the trial court did not address this claim on Schwenke's Motion to 
Arrest Judgment, the motion did not operate to preserve the claim. See State v. 
Beason, 2000 UT App 1089, If 14,2 P.3d 459. Moreover, Schwenke's claim is also 
devoid of legal analysis regarding prosecutorial misconduct, providing a further 
basis for this Court to decline to address it. See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^ 22-23, 
128 P.3d 1179 (refusing to address claim that was "devoid of any analysis"). 
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In any event, the prosecution acknowledged at trial that an omission 
becomes fraudulent only when the omitted information is necessary to clarify a 
prior statement that is misleading without it. The prosecutor elicited testimony 
from Hines that an omission is actionable under the statute if a person "make[s] 
any nature of statement in connection with the offer or sale [of a security] and 
. . . fail[s] to state the rest of the story, if the rest of the story would make the 
statement. . . misleading/' R.3: 90. Hines explained that "[t]he statement that's 
made does not have to be false/7 but that it "has to be misleading in light of the 
circumstances under which there is an omission/7 R.3: 90-91. Hines later 
reiterated that "material facts don't have to be disclosed if there isn't some 
predicate statement that's made." R.3:106. 
To demonstrate the concept, the prosecutor presented a hypothetical to 
Hines where a seller of stock has ten investors who each invested, and lost, one 
million dollars. R.3: 91. Hines confirmed that if the seller were to tell proposed 
purchasers of stock that he has 10 people who already invested one million 
dollars each, without disclosing the loss, the statement would be true, but 
misleading in light of the omitted information. R.3: 91. This comports with the 
law. See supra, at 23-24. 
The prosecutor did not argue otherwise. During closing, he explained 
that if a seller of stock makes a statement, "it has to be a complete, full, honest 
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statement/7 R.4: 369-70. He then provided an example from his childhood 
where he gave an accurate response to a question from his mother which was 
nevertheless misleading because it did not include facts that undercut the 
response. R.4: 370-71. Schwenke argued in closing that the State did not 
identify any predicate statements that were misleading in light of undisclosed 
information. See R.4:386-93. In his rebuttal, the prosecutor did not suggest that 
the State need not prove a predicate statement, but argued that it had 
established those statements. See R.4: 403-10. He then identified those 
undisclosed material facts, i.e., those facts a reasonable person would consider 
important in making a decision. See R.4: 406-08. 
In sum, contrary to Schwenke7s claim, the prosecutor did not misstate the 
law. 
B. THE INFORMATION, TOGETHER W I T H THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
GAVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST SCHWENKE. 
Schwenke also argues that his constitutional rights were violated because, 
he asserts, the charges did not give him adequate notice of his alleged 
misleading statements and of the material omissions which should have been 
disclosed. Aplt. Brf. at 34-35. This claim lacks merit. A defendant must, of 
course, be notified of the elements of the offense. See State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, 
f 9,116 P.3d 360. Beyond that, " [a] defendant need only be 'fully apprised of 
the State's [knowledge] regarding the time, place, and date of the crimes, [and] 
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any lack of factual specificity goes not to the constitutional adequacy of the 
notice, but to the credibility of the State's case/ " State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 
238, H 16,166 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1033 (Utah 1991)) 
(brackets in original), cert, denied, 186 P.3d 347 (Utah 2007). The information, 
which identified the elements of the offense, together with the testimony 
adduced at the preliminary hearing, was more than sufficient to satisfy the 
constitutional notice requirements. 
C. SCHWENKE'S REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS WERE NOT 
PRESERVED. 
Schwenke also contends: (1) that his due process rights were violated 
because the State in effect charged him for something that is not a crime; (2) that 
section 61-1-1 is unconstitutionally vague as applied; and (3) that the State 
violated the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Brf. 
at 35-37. None of these issues were preserved below and Schwenke has not 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, this Court should 
not address these constitutional claims for the first time on appeal. See Winfield, 
2006 UT 4, at ^ 23. In any event, all of the claims rest on the premise that the 
State misstated the law regarding liability for material omissions. See Aplt. Brf. 
at 35-37. As explained, supra, at 30-32, the prosecutor did not misstate the law. 
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IV. 
EVIDENCE OF THE LOAN, THE PURCHASE OF 
ADDITIONAL COWS, AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING WERE RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES AT TRIAL 
Schwenke also argues that the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant 
evidence, to wit: (a) a trust deed dated October 16, 2000, Aplt. Brf. at 38-41; (b) 
testimony that Schwenke promised to pay for 200 cows delivered one month 
following the sale of the stock, Aplt. Brf. at 38, 41-42; and (c) expert testimony 
regarding initial public offerings (IPOs), 38, 42-48. All three claims fail.9 
A. EVIDENCE OF THE LOAN SECURED BY A TRUST DEED W A S RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE OF SCHWENKE'S CONTROL OVER THE CORPORATION. 
Schwenke challenges the introduction of a trust deed (SE9) and notice of 
default (SE10), arguing that the loan secured by the trust deed and upon which 
the notice of default was filed was "not relevant to the alleged security fraud" 
because "it had no bearing or connection to [the] alleged stock sale." Aplt. Brf. 
9
 Schwenke also baldly asserts that admission of the evidence was 
inflammatory and prejudicial. See Aplt. Brf. at 40-43/49. However, he fails to 
conduct any analysis under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Indeed, he does 
not cite to rule 403 at all. See Aplt. Brf. at 40-43,49. This Court will not address 
an inadequately briefed claim. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, at \ \ 22-23. 
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at 38-40.10 Schwenke, however, did not object to this evidence and has not 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. See R.3: 76,163-65; R.4: 277-78. 
Accordingly, this Court should not address his claim for the first time on appeal. 
See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, at t 23.n 
In any event, the evidence was relevant to the issues at trial. In his 
opening statement, Schwenke claimed that the stock purchase was not a stock 
transaction at all, but merely a change in the form of the dairy business to a 
corporation, where Myers and Young continued to have absolute ownership 
and control of the farm. See R.3: 68-73. The loan evidence rebutted this claim, 
demonstrating that after the stock purchase, Schwenke, as president of 
American-Dairy.com, had control of the farm and wTas able to encumber it to 
secure loans, without the knowledge of Myers and Young. See R.3:163-64; R.4: 
Schwenke also contends that "there was no evidence of a note for 
$50,000, no evidence that the missing note was funded, and no evidence that 
[he] took $50,000." Aplt. Brf. at 39. However, the trust deed itself was evidence 
of indebtedness and Schwenke ignores the testimony of Young that Schwenke 
confirmed to him that he borrowed the $50,000. See R.3:164. Schwenke could 
have testified or introduced contrary evidence, but he chose not to. Schwenke 
asserts that his attorney was ineffective for not doing so, but he fails to cite any 
authority or provide any legal analysis for this proposition. Therefore, this 
Court should not address it. See Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, f 25,149 P.3d 
352. In any event, Schwenke also represented himself at trial in a sort of hybrid 
representation. As such, he cannot reasonably complain about a failure to 
introduce evidence that he could have introduced himself. 
1 ]
 Where the trial court did not address this claim on Schwenke's Motion 
to Arrest Judgment, the motion did not operate to preserve the claim. See State 
v. Beason, 2000 UT App 1089, f 14, 2 P.3d 459. 
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277-78. It also suggested that Schwenke did not have the $10 million in 
investments that he represented he had when he proposed the stock purchase to 
Myers and Young. See R.3:125. 
B. EVIDENCE OF SCHWENKE'S AGREEMENT TO PAY FOR ADDITIONAL 
Cows AND His FAILURE TO D O SO WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF 
SCHWENKE'S INTENT. 
Schwenke also contends that his agreement to pay for 200 additional cows 
and his subsequent failure to do so came after the stock purchase and was thus 
irrelevant. Aplt. Brf. at 41-42. But as explained by the prosecutor in response to 
Schwenke's objection below, such evidence was relevant as to Schwenke's intent 
"for the whole scheme." R.3:158. "[Ijntent may be inferred 'from conduct and 
attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience/" 
including from conduct occurring after the alleged crime. State v. Hawkins, 967 
P.2d 966, 972 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 
1981) and citing State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 116 (Utah 1986)). Evidence that 
Schwenke failed to pay for the cows as agreed also helped establish that 
Schwenke did not have the millions in investment money he told Young that he 
had. See R.3:125. 
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C. EVIDENCE REGARDING IPO 'S WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF 
SCHWENKE'S MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE OFFER AND SALE OF AMERICAN-DAIRY.COM STOCK. 
Finally, Schwenke contends that Hines7 testimony regarding IPO's was 
irrelevant and prejudicial because the case "d[id] not involve an Initial Public 
Offering ('IPO7) of stock/7 Aplt. Brf. at 42-48. That may be so, but as discussed, 
both Myers and Young testified that the very foundation of the investment plan, 
as represented by Schwenke, was that the corporation would be offering the 
stock publicly through an IPO, which was almost assured. See R.3:127,141-42; 
R.4: 228. Indeed, Myers and Young understood that a return on their 
investment depended on that public offering. See R.3: 123,127,134; R.4: 228, 
236-37,259-63. As discussed, supra, at,, because Schwenke represented the IPO 
as the foundation of the plan, he assumed a duty of full disclosure. As such, 
Hines' testimony regarding the requirements for an IPO were relevant in 
demonstrating the material facts Schwenke should have disclosed, but did not. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted July 8, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IEY S. GRAY 
(ssistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004) 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13 (West Supp. 2009) 
* * * 
(z) "Promoter" means a person who, acting alone or in concert with one or 
more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the business or 
enterprise of a person. 
* * * 
(ee)(i) "Security" means a: 
(A) note; 
(B) stock; 
(C) treasury stock; 
(D)bond; 
(E) debenture; 
(F) evidence of indebtedness; 
(G) certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement; 
(H) collateral-trust certificate; 
(I) preorganization certificate or subscription; 
(J) transferable share; 
(K) investment contract; 
(L) burial certificate or burial contract; 
(M) voting-trust certificate; 
(N) certificate of deposit for a security; 
(O) certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or 
lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease; 
(P) commodity contract or commodity option; 
(Q) interest in a limited liability company; 
(R) life settlement interest; or 
(S) in general, an interest or instrument commonly known as a 
"security," or a certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase an item listed in Subsections (l)(ee)(i)(A) through 
(R). 
(ii) "Security" does not include: 
(A) an insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which 
an insurance company promises to pay money in a lump sum or 
periodically for life or some other specified period; 
(B) an interest in a limited liability company in which the limited 
liability company is formed as part of an estate plan where all of the 
members are related by blood or marriage, or the person claiming this 
exception can prove that all of the members are actively engaged in the 
management of the limited liability company; or 
(C) (I) a whole long-term estate in real property; 
(II) an undivided fractionalized long-term estate in real property 
that consists of ten or fewer owners; or 
(III) an undivided fractionalized long-term estate in real property 
that consists of more than ten owners if, when the real property estate is 
subject to a management agreement: 
(Aa) the management agreement permits a simple majority of 
owners of the real property estate to not renew or to terminate the 
management agreement at the earlier of the end of the management 
agreement's current term, or 180 days after the day on which the 
owners give notice of termination to the manager; 
(Bb) the management agreement prohibits, directly or indirectly, 
the lending of the proceeds earned from the real property estate or the 
use or pledge of its assets to a person or entity affiliated with or under 
common control of the manager; and 
(Cc) the management agreement complies with any other 
requirement imposed by rule by the Real Estate Commission under 
Section 61-2-26. 
(iii) For purposes of Subsection (l)(ee)(ii)(B), evidence that members vote 
or have the right to vote, or the right to information concerning the business and 
affairs of the limited liability company, or the right to participate in management, 
may not establish, without more, that all members are actively engaged in the 
management of the limited liability company. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (West 2004) 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the 
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation. 
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Division of Corporations & Commercial Code 
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor, S.M. Box 146705 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6705 
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egistration Number: 4744008-0142 February 2, 2007 
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egistered Date: APRIL 13, 2000 
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"HE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE ("DIVISION") HEREBY 
'ERTIFIES THAT THE ATTACHED IS TRUE, CORRECT, AND COMPLETE COPY OF THE ARTICLES 
)F INCORPORATION OF 
AMERICAN-DAIRY.COM, INC. 
LS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIVISION. 
>ept. of Professional Licensing Real Estate Public Utilities Securities Consumer Protection 
(801)530-6628 (801)530-6747 (801)530-6651 (801)530-6600 (801)530-6601 
"--i°jji,y 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
AMERICAN-DAIRY.COM
 S \ S \ C . 
* * * * * tfU fm. 
- at © 
— in x , i ? „
We, ihe undersigned persons acting as incorporators under the Uiah Revised Busjtfiess 
J -a IB 
- a Corporation Act, adopt the following Articles of Incorporation for such Corporation.
 n « 
a l l 
Article I o S < 
The name of the corporation is AMKRICAN-DAreY.COM K V^» 
Article II 
The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized is to engage in and operate 
a dairy. The Corporation shall further have unlimited power to engage in and do any lawfiil act 
concerning any and all lawfiil business for which corporations may be organized under the Utah 
Revised Business Corporation Act and any amendments thereto. 
Article nr 












Corporation Act, The corporation elects to have preemptive rights as provided through the Utah 
Revised Business Coiporation Act. 
Article A^ 
The address of the corporation's initial registered office shall be 220 South 200 East, Suite 
110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. The corporation's initial registered agent at such address shall be 
Victor Lawrence, Esq. 
I hereby acknowledge and accept appointment as corporation registered agent. 
.-*./£Z^-i r iFTi-JED 
Victor Lavrence, Esq., / / APR 1 2 2000 
Article V / oeahCiv.OfCorp.fcCowm.Coi 
The names and addresses of the incorporators are set forth below. The corporation does 
hereby elect to eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation or to its shareholders 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
Page ) 
for monetary damages for any action taken or any failure to take any action as a director as allowed 
by law and/or authorized by bylaws adopted by the corporation 
A. Paul Schwcnke 
304 East Pavilion Cir., 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Victor Lawrence, Esq., 
220 South 200 East Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We, A. Paul Schweuke and Victor Lawrence, Esq., have executed 
these Articles of Incorporation in duplicate this //T day of April, 2000, and say that we are all 
incorporators herein; that we have read the above and foregoing Articles of Incorporation; that the 
contents thereof are true to the best of our knowledge and belief, excepting as to matters alleged 
upon information and belief, and as to those matters they are believed to be true, 
DATED this ,Mll <% of April, 2000. 
A. Pmfl Schwenke 
ARTICLES OF 1NCORPOR ATIOK 
Page 2 
STOCK PURCHASE/TRADE AGREEMENT . 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this of August, 
2000, by and between American-dairy.com, Inc. ("Seller"), and Milk-King Dairy, 
L.C. ("Purchaser"). 
WHEREAS, the Seller is the record owner and holder of the issue d and 
outstanding shares of the capital stock of American-dairy.com, Inc. 
("Corporation"), a Utah corporation, which Corporation has issued capital stock of 
10,000,000 shares of .001 cents par value common stock; and 
WHEREAS, the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and the Seller 
desires to sell said stock, upon the terms and subject to the conditions hereinafter 
set forth; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements contained in this Agreement, and in order to consummate the 
purchase and the sale of the Corporation's Stock aforementioned, it is hereby 
agreed as follows: 
1. PURCHASE AND SALE: 
Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, at the closing of 
the transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell, convey, transfer, and 
deliver to the Purchaser certificates representing such stock, and the Purchaser 
shall purchase from the Seller the Corporation's Stock in consideration of the 
purchase price set forth in this Agreement. The certificates representing the 
Corporation's Stock shall be duly endorsed for transfer or accompanied by 
appropriate stock transfer powers duly executed in blankjn_ejther case with 
signatures guaranteed in the customary fashion. The closing of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement ("Closing"), shall be held at 220 South 200 East, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on August 3, 2000, at 1:00 p.m., or such 
other place, date and time as the parties hereto may otherwise agree. 
2. AMOUNT AN D PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. 
The total consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
3. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. 
Seller hereby warrants and represents: 
(a) Organization and Standing. Corporation is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of 
Utah and has the corporate power and authority to carry on its business as it is no 
being conducted. 
(b) Restrictions on Stock. 
I. The Seller is not a party to any agreement, written or oral, creating 
rights in respect to the Corporation's Stock in any third person or relating to the 
voting of the Corporation's Stock. 
II. Seller is the lawful owner of the Stock, free and clear of all 
security interests, liens, encumbrances, equities and other charges. 
Ill There are no existing warrants, options, stock purchase 
agreements, redemption agreements, restrictions or any nature, calls or rights to 
subscribe of any character relating to the stock, nor are there any securities 
convertible into such stock. 
4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER AND 
PURCHASER. 
Seller and Purchaser hereby represent and warrant that there has been no 
act or omission by Seller, Purchaser or the Corporation which would give rise to 
any valid claim against any of the parties hereto for a brokerage commission, 
finder's fee, or other like payment in connection with the transactions 
contemplated hereby. 
5. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
(a) Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the exhibits hereto and 
any written amendments hereof executed by the parties) constitutes the entire 
Agreement and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, oral and 
written, between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. 
(b) Sections and Other Headings. The section and other headings 
contained in this Agreement are for reference purposes only and shall not affect 
the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 
(c) Governing Law. This agreement, and all transactions contemplated 
hereby, shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. The parties herein waive trial by jury and agree to 
submit to the personal jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. In the event that litigation 
results from or arises out of this Agreement or the performance thereof, the 
parties agree to reimburse the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees, court 
costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the court as costs, in 
addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled. 
6. OPTION TO PURCHASER. 
Purchaser shall have the option to sell the stock that it purchased under 
this Agreement back to Seller for the following consideration: 
(a) Reconveyance by deed of all the real properties listed on Exhibit A that 
had been conveyed under this Agreement, subject to debt not to exceed the 
balance of the debt that was existing at the time of this Agreement less 
reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments from the time of this 
Agreement. 
(b) Reconveyance by bill of sale of all the personal properties and 
equipment listed on Exhibit A that had been conveyed under this Agreement, 
subject to debt not to exceed the balance of the debt that was existing at the time 
of this Agreement less reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments 
from the time of this Agreement. 
(c) Improvements since this Agreement. 
Purchaser, upon the exercise of the option herein, agrees to reimburse 
Seller for Jhf„vs»iua.of imnccsftmentsiQ the dairy operations from the time of this 
Agreement to the date of the exercise of Purchaser's option. 
I. Cows: Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for all costs and expenses 
in connection with the purchase of cows purchased by American-dairy.com from 
the time of this Agreement...If the cows are financed, the parties shall take all 
necessary steps, if permitted by the financing institution to qualify Purchaser to 
assume the indebtedness on the cows. 
II. Equipment including computer and internet: Purchaser shall 
"reimburse Seller for the cost of all equipments installed or purchased by Seller 
since the time of this Agreement. 
The parties acknowledge that pursuant to the exercise of this option to 
repurchase, that Purchaser desires, if possible, to acquire and/or continue to 
operate its dairy business with the cows and equipment acquired by Seller. 
However, the Purchaser cannot be compelled to assume any financing or pay 
costs if Purchaser is unable. If the financing on the cows and equipment cannot 
be assured, the Seller and Purchaser agree to work together insofar as possible, 
to let Purchasers operate with the existing financing on them. The aforesaid is 
subject to rights of any financial institution having a lien on or an interest in the 
cows and equipment. 
The Purchaser has the right to exercise this option if, after a reasonable 
time and in no event more than two years from the time of this Agreement, 
American-dairy.com, Inc. has not registered its stock for a public offering. 
7. DIRECTORSHIP. 
Purchaser shall have the right to appoint one member of the Board of 
Directors. Such member will be in addition to the presently constituted board of 
directors. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of 
the individual parties hereto on the date first above written. 
DAIRY.COM, INC. MILK-KING DAIRY, L.C. 
JAM1S Wl. JOHNSON, CEO AMES L. YO 
lanaging Me 
EXHIBIT "A" 
AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE 
(a) Consideration. 
As total consideration for the purchase and sale of the Corporation's Stock, 
pursuant to this Agreement, the Purchaser shall pay to the Seller the sum of Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000), in trade for the equivalent sum 
representing equity in Milk-King Dairy, L.C., properties and equipment. Such total 
consideration to be referred to in this Agreement as the "Purchase Price". 
(b) Payment. 
1. The deed to the following real properties shall be duly 
executed and delivered to American-dairy.com at the time of closing: 
The real property comprising the Milk King Farms, L.C. dairy operation 
as set forth in the attached Deed and legal description 
2. The bill of sale for the following personal properties and 
equipment: 
See the Exhibit attached to that Bill of Sale attached hereto. 
The stock shall be issued as follows: 
Ronald R. Myers 150,000 shares 
James L. Young 50,000 shares 
SCHEDULE "A" 
John Deer 7200 Tractor 
Schuler4910 Vertical Mixer 
^| <?f.?rf 
Double -12 parallel milk parlor and associated equipment, 
including stalls, milking units, milk transfer equipment, yL. s? ^J 
milk storage and cooling equipment / *7 / y 
Heatwatch Electronic Heat Detection System J ^ ^ 
Scoopmobile LD-7 Loader u 
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